The Irish Economy

I have considered for many years that the Irish economy suffers from a fundamental lack of competitiveness. Unfortunately this was persistently ignored during the crazy property bubble years of the 2 nd phase of the Celtic Tiger. So what was misleadingly trumpeted then by politicians as "inherent strengths" of the Irish economy e.g. continuing high growth and employment were in effect hiding the true reality of a highly artificial economy, with bad value and poor work practices evident in every sector. One of the unchallenged assumptions that was made here was that removal of barriers in the EU internal market would in itself guarantee competition in Ireland. However for a number of reasons this argument is highly suspect due to grave faults with respect to the way the market operates. Though the market works better in relation to freely traded goods, even here major impediments exist. For example Governments prevent cars being freely imported from lower price jurisdiction

There is little doubt that Ireland is in the grips of a deep recession at present. The inflation rate is currently - 6.5% (on an annualised basis) and real output could fall by 10% this year. Because liquidity is so tight with banks at present many small and medium sized businesses are finding it extremely difficult to survive. In deed it is heartbreaking to hear on programmes like Joe Duffy's " Liveline " the incredible pressures that many of these are now, with unpaid debts mounting and the prospects of survival looking slim. We all know the reasons why banks are refusing these firms credit. Because of the huge losses they have suffered from wildly speculative lending during the property boom, their balance sheets are now in a bad way. Therefore they have a vested interest in preserving money to meet uncertain future liabilities, rather than lend it to stressed businesses in the midst of a recession. And despite all the efforts of the Government here at capitali

It was fascinating following the three BBC Money Programmes on the financial crisis following the collapse a year ago of Lehman Bros. My gut instinct at the time was that the situation was gravely serious. I indeed considered for how long money could be withdrawn from bank deposits and whether the Government here would be able to maintain payment to public sector workers. Then when the system survived I began to wonder whether my initial fears represented an over-reaction. Viewing however the re-enactment of the Lehman collapse and the great uncertainty which followed, I can now see that my fears were indeed well grounded with the international financial system literally hanging on the edge of a precipice and the very real threat of total collapse a genuine possibility. Now a year later we are beginning to hear optimistic noises regarding the prospects of economic recovery. Today for example the IMF has forecast an overall drop in world output of just 1% for 2009 with a return to a ver

The success of the Irish Celtic Tiger (1994 - 2008) can basically be divided into two main phases. The first more successful phase witnessed a tremendous expansion in multinational corporate investment in Ireland (largely of US origin). Exports were the main driver of growth during this period dramatically surging from less than €30 bl. in 1994 to over €90 bl. (current prices) by 2000. For anyone who studied these figures an alarming trend however was in evidence post 2000 with merchandise export growth completely stalling. So present figures are now lower (even in current price terms) than almost a decade previously. Though there were worrying signs in evidence by 2000 that the property boom had already grown out of control, such fears were quickly disregarded. So after a brief slowdown lasting a couple of years (2001-2002) - the second phase of the Celtic Tiger took off almost entirely fuelled by a hugely artificial property bubble. As we now are now slowly coming to terms with